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Abstract 
This article investigates the pragmatic function of new negative markers during incipient 
renewal of negation (Jespersen’s cycle). It outlines a typology of such markers, suggesting a 
pathway by which they begin as specialized for use with discourse-old propositions and later 
expand to inferred propositions before finally becoming possible with discourse-new 
propositions. This framework is applied to an overlooked case of Jespersen’s cycle in North 
Germanic: replacement of early Norwegian ei(gi) ‘not’ by ekki (originally “nothing”) from 
1250 to 1550. We document a sharp rise in frequency of ekki around 1425, suggesting that, 
until then, ekki had been restricted to negating discourse-old propositions. Once this 
constraint was lifted, ei(gi) and ekki competed directly, resulting in rapid replacement of 
ei(gi) by ekki. This typologically unusual direct replacement of a negator with no intervening 
doubling stage can be attributed to the new negator’s origin as a negative indefinite and the 
lack of negative concord in early Norwegian.  
 
Keywords: negation, cyclic change, Jespersen’s cycle, information structure, emphasis, Old 
Norwegian, Middle Norwegian. 
 
1 Introduction 
A number of studies (Cinque 1976, Espinal 1999, Schwenter 2005) have suggested that, 
where a language has two ways to express negation, one of them is associated with additional 
procedural meaning, often based on the information-structure status of the negated 
proposition. Furthermore, when applied to historical situations (Hansen 2009, Hansen & 
Visconti 2009, Larrivée 2016, Schwenter 2006, Wallage 2013) this suggestion leads to the 
idea that new markers of negation proceed through a stage when they act as negators of 
discourse-old propositions, extending their domain over time along a hierarchy of discourse 
contexts before generalizing as the unmarked negation strategy in the language. In this paper, 
we take stock of these existing proposals, and extend the resulting framework for 
understanding the development of innovative negative markers to a new case study. 
Specifically, we examine the emergence of ekki, a new marker of negation that developed in 
Old Norwegian (1000–1350) and Middle Norwegian (1350–1550) in competition with the 
existing marker ei(gi), eventually replacing it entirely. We test whether, in its early stages, 
ekki was specialized for discourse-old (‘activated’) contexts, coming into direct competition 
with ei(gi) only when that specialized function had become eroded. 
 We begin by introducing Jespersen’s cycle, the cyclic renewal of markers of negation 
(section 3), and review previous explanations of it in terms of a pull chain motivated by 
phonological weakening of the original negator, or a push chain motivated by weakening of 
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the pragmatic force of the new negator due to overuse (section 4). Two hypothesis about the 
pragmatics of newly emergent negators, the ‘emphasis hypothesis’ and the ‘activation’ 
hypothesis are set out in section 4. Our aim is to test the activation hypothesis on Middle 
Norwegian data, and we therefore go into the notion of activation (previous activation of an 
idea in a discourse) and how it has been used in studying the diachrony of negation in some 
detail in section 5. The second half of the paper tests this idea for the cyclic renewal of 
negation from ei(gi) to ekki in Middle Norwegian, demonstrating the relevant developments 
in detail for this first time (section 6), before reporting our methods for data collection and 
coding (section 7) and results (section 8). Our results suggest that ekki was at first restricted 
to negating discourse-old propositions, before undergoing pragmatic unmarking and 
competing directly with ei(gi). It thus fits in to the broader crosslinguistic typology which 
suggests that pragmatic activation is evident at the early stages of Jespersen’s cycle. 
 
2 Background to Jespersen’s cycle 
Jespersen’s cycle is the name given to a sequence of changes by which the means of marking 
clausal negation in a language are renewed. This remarkably consistent sequence has been 
observed in the histories of a large number of languages. While the cycle was first described 
as early as 1904 by the Egyptologist Alan Gardiner (1904: 134), it came to prominence 
principally through the work of Otto Jespersen (1917: 6–14), who originally described it on 
the basis of developments from Latin to French, Old Norse to Danish, and Old to Modern 
English: 
 
The original negative adverb is first weakened, then found insufficient and therefore 
strengthened, generally through some additional word, and this in its turn may be felt as the 
negative proper and may then in course of time be subject to the same development as the 
original word. (Jespersen 1917: 4) 
 
Jespersen’s work was integrated into a typological framework by Östen Dahl, who first 
termed this phenomenon ‘Jespersen’s cycle’ (Dahl 1979: 88–89). 
 Jespersen’s description gives the following constructions in the cycle, illustrated using 
examples from the development of negation in French, the best known example: 
 
construction I: negation is marked with a (canonically preverbal) adverb (ne V); 
construction II: negation is marked with the preverbal adverb plus an innovative (canonically 
postverbal) adverb (ne V pas); 
construction III: negation is marked only with the innovative postverbal adverb (V pas). 
 
In the canonical Jespersen’s cycle, constructions I and II coexist for a time, before 
construction II wins out, and constructions II and III coexist for a time, before construction 
III wins out. A language that consistently uses only construction II can be referred to as a 
stage II language, and so on for the other constructions, but most languages undergoing the 
cycle are in fact in transition between two stages, the relative stability of written French 
ne…pas being atypical in this respect, perhaps due to the unusually strong prescriptive 
pressure in this case (cf. Ayres-Bennett 1994: 74–75). It is indeed not unknown for a 
language to exhibit all three constructions at a single point in its development (van der 
Auwera 2010: 78, Willis 2012: 115). 
 The innovative adverb added in construction II typically begins life as an adverbial or 
nominal generalizer or minimizer. The nominal minimizers known from the most well-
studied examples of the cycle generally start out as nouns referring to small objects (e.g. 
κλωνί “twig” and ψίχαλο “crumb” in Greek; pas “step” and mie “crumb” in French) before 
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being reanalysed as adverbial elements and undergoing semantic extension to a wider set of 
contexts.1 The pathway of semantic development for such a noun is “minimal piece” > 
“minimal quantity” > “minimal degree” (Kiparsky & Condoravdi 2006: 173–175). 
 Minimizers are focused elements, used by speakers to stress the informativity of their 
message. As a result they become negative polarity items (NPIs), ultimately restricted to 
direct negative contexts only.2 By being focused, they evoke alternative propositions ordered 
on a scale (I didn’t eat a crumb, I didn’t eat an apple, I didn’t eat a sandwich, I didn’t eat a 
three-course meal etc.). Being used by speakers to stress informativity, they must express the 
most surprising point on the scale. The minimal amount is only the most surprising or 
improbable point on a negative scale: I didn’t eat a crumb is more surprising or improbable 
than I didn’t eat an apple, since it gives rise to a scalar implicature that the predicate fails to 
hold of all objects greater than “a crumb”. However, in an affirmative context, a minimizer is 
the least informative choice: I ate a crumb is not more surprising or improbable than I ate an 
apple (Eckardt 2006, 2012, Israel 2001, 2011; see also discussion of emphasis below). Once 
conventionalized as the usual way of expressing surprising or improbable negation, the 
minimizer may be reanalysed as a marker of clausal negation. It is widely assumed that 
during the transition from stage I to stage II, when construction II is available but not 
mandatory, it has the function of expressing distinctively ‘emphatic’ negation (Kiparsky & 
Condoravdi 2006: 173–175). 
 Similar logic can be applied to another common source of Jespersen’s cycle, namely 
indefinites (e.g. nāwiht “nothing” > not in Old and Middle English; niowiht “nothing” > nicht 
in Old and Middle High German; dim “anything” in Welsh etc.). These may sometimes 
function directly as minimizers, but in other cases, they are generalizing items, developing 
negative uses from their association with free-choice items: the proposition is said to be false 
for an arbitrarily chosen member of the set of possible objects (cf. Horn’s 2000 view of 
English any) or for the value assigned to the object in all possible worlds, cf. Giannakidou’s 
(2001) account of free choice. Thus it is said to be true of even the most surprising or 
improbable member of that set. 
 Finally, negative indefinite temporal adverbs (Colloquial English never, Cape 
Verdean Portuguese Creole ka “not” < Portuguese nunca “never”) become negators as a 
consequence of being extended metaphorically from quantifying over possible times to 
quantifying over possible worlds (situations). They thereby come to mean that the proposition 
is false even under the most favourable conceivable conditions for it to be true. 
                                                
1 Note, however, that the very plausible suggestion that those minimizers which have become 
negative markers were once restricted to occur with semantically consonant verbs before 
being extended has yet to be conclusively demonstrated. 
2 Price (1978, 1993) shows that this the development minimizer > NPI > negative is found 
even in the history of French pas, despite first appearances. This should be kept separate from 
another question, namely whether the development of indefinites generally also proceeds in 
the same direction, towards more negative interpretations (Ladusaw 1993; Haspelmath 1997; 
Willis 2012) or whether change reflects a ‘random walk’ (Hansen 2012, 2014; Jäger 2010). 
While the tendency towards more negative interpretations (if change occurs at all) seems to 
be real, it is clear that local pressures sometimes prevail over the general pattern. For 
instance, when systems of indefinites are created from etymologically unrelated items, 
analogical pressure leads towards greater alignment, sometimes reversing the general trend. 
So, items such as French nul ‘no’ or nient ‘nothing’ became less ‘negative’ over time 
(Labelle & Espinal 2014), assimilating their distribution to such items as rien ‘anything’ and 
aucun ‘anyone’ (Haspelmath 1997: 232–3; Willis 2012: 290), against the general 
crosslinguistic trend. 
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3 Explanations for Jespersen’s cycle: emphatic negation and information structure 
Awareness of the form of the constructions present at each stage of the cycle was present in 
large part in Jespersen’s original work on the subject and remains relatively uncontroversial. 
In other respects, our understanding of the cycle has developed. Jespersen originally 
understood the cycle as a pull chain driven by phonetic weakening through sound change of 
the plain negative creating the need for a more salient element (Breitbarth 2009: 85–96, 
Hansen 2009: 230, Horn 1989: 456–457, van der Auwera 2010: 80–81, Willis 2010: 113–
114). This now seems dubious, at least for some cases. Kiparsky & Condoravdi (2006: 175) 
argue that, in the attested cases of Jespersen’s cycle — they disregard the reduction of Latin 
non to French ne — there is no evidence that the original negator underwent phonological 
reduction, but abundant evidence that the new negator did (cf. the irregular phonological 
reduction of Old English nāwiht to Middle English noht and Present-day English not). This is 
what would be expected from our understanding of the way phonological erosion operates in 
grammaticalization more generally. Hansen (2009: 230) argues that the reduction of Latin 
non to French ne cannot be responsible for the onset of Jespersen’s cycle in French. She 
suggests that such an approach accounts neither for the gap of many centuries between the 
reduction of non to ne and the emergence of reinforcement nor for the presence of the cycle 
in other Romance varieties (northern Italo-Romance and Catalan) where reduction did not go 
this far. Van der Auwera (2010: 76, 80–81) regards the pull-chain view as now outdated for 
the paradigm examples of Jespersen’s cycle (French pas and Dutch niet), but leaves open the 
question of whether it could be correct in other cases. 
 In place of the traditional pull-chain model, various linguists have suggested a push-
chain model built on the idea of a spiral of weakening proposed originally by Meillet (1912: 
394). On this approach, semantic–pragmatic forces weakening the force of the ‘emphatic’ 
negative are the trigger and driver of the cycle: increased expressive use of the new form 
leads to its losing its emphatic force, and a pressure to eliminate the resulting redundancy (as 
both old and new negators now compete for the same function) leads to the replacement of 
the old by the new (Breitbarth 2009: 86–87, Kiparsky & Condoravdi 2006: 176, Schwegler 
1983: 320–32, 1988: 36, 48, Willis 2010: 114). Detges (2003: 226–227) suggests that, since 
the emphatic negator indicates that the proposition expressed is unexpected or surprising, 
speakers are incentivized to overuse it in order to capture the hearer’s attention according to 
the Gricean maxim of relation (relevance). Israel (2011: 110–11) views this as a positive 
politeness strategy to intensify the hearer’s interest. For instance, (1) may be used (and then 
overused) in preference to simpler (2), since it suggests a more surprising state of affairs 
designed to engage the hearer’s attention. 
 
(1)  I didn’t get paid at all / a penny. 
(2)  I didn’t get paid. 
 
As speakers overuse the emphatic negator, however, the emphatic effect is gradually lost by 
an invisible-hand process, as hearers increasingly discount the contribution of the second 
negator. Hearers understand speakers’ use of the expression as overstating the proposition, 
and conventionalize their understanding accordingly, weakening the semantic contribution of 
the expression (Detges & Waltereit 2002: 176–181). 
 Other recent work has suggested a hybrid approach, namely, that, in at least some 
cases, Jespersen’s cycle may be both a pull and push chain. Research into the rise of the 
modern Welsh negative ddim via Jespersen’s cycle demonstrates that the change was a push 
chain in its early stages, driven by a loss of the emphatic character of the innovative form, but 
later became a pull chain, as sound change rendered the older negative ni(d) phonetically 
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weak (Willis 2010: 148–149). Work on Jespersen’s cycle in West Germanic suggests that one 
trigger for the cycle may have been semantic–syntactic weakening of the preverbal negative 
ne/ni, which came in some contexts to be interpreted as a negative polarity item rather than 
an expression of sentential negation, but that it was also triggered by the reanalysis of 
postverbal negative items as expressions of sentential negation; thus here too the cycle can be 
seen as simultaneously a pull and push chain (Breitbarth 2009: 104–107). 
 
4 Emphasis and activation 
Before turning to our case study, we need to clarify another aspect of Jespersen’s cycle, 
namely the pragmatic status of the new negator and the terminology used to describe this 
status. While new negators at the early stages of Jespersen’s cycle are often described as 
‘emphatic’, this term is often treated in an intuitive, ill-defined way, and, even when linguists 
do define emphasis, they do not always agree on what it means. This section clarifies the 
terminology. We will conclude that there are two distinct hypotheses about the semantics of 
newly emergent negator, which we term the emphasis hypothesis and the activation 
hypothesis. Our case study tests the activation hypothesis. 
 Some linguists define emphatic negation in an essentially syntactic way as the use of 
more than one negative item. Van der Wouden (1997: 243) thus defines it as “the usage of 
multiple negation to strengthen the force of the negation”. Similarly, for Zeijlstra (2004: 58), 
emphatic negation occurs when “one negative element enforces [sic] another negative 
element”, the result being “stronger than would be the case with just the second negative 
element”. However, this kind of definition does not help us to distinguish between, say, 
ne…pas in Old French (normally thought of as in some way ‘emphatic’), and ne…pas in 
Modern French (normally thought of as expressing ordinary negation).3 It is also not 
particularly useful when dealing with historical data, since it not the form of the negation that 
is at issue, but its semantics at a given state of the history of a language. 
 More relevant to the present discussion is Israel’s (1996, 2001, 2011) treatment of 
emphasis as a property of one type of negative polarity item, namely, minimizers such as 
(sleep) a wink, and of one type of positive polarity item, such as awfully. On this view, 
emphatic items are inherently scalar and have a high informational value (i-value). Emphasis 
involves a speaker expressing the attitude that the informative strength of their proposition is 
high. Emphatic items license inferences to all informationally weaker options on their scale, 
and thereby commit the speaker to a maximally informative interpretation of what has been 
said. Thus, in (3), the emphatic element the least bit evokes a scale of nervousness, and 
commits the speaker to the inference that all degrees of nervousness greater than or equal to 
“the least bit” would cause the sky-diving to be cancelled. 
 
(3)  If you’re the least bit nervous, we can skip the sky-diving. (Israel 2001: 298) 
 
 Continuing in this tradition, Larrivée (2014: 121) interprets emphasis as concerning 
“unmitigated assertions … which cannot … be subsequently hedged or toned down”. Thus, 
example (4), with the emphatic negator rien du tout “not (nothing) at all”, is pragmatically 
infelicitous because the hedge in the second sentence is incompatible with the claim of 
maximal informativity made in the first sentence. Conversely, example (5), with ordinary 
negation, makes no such claim and is felicitous. 
 
                                                
3 Once obsolescent, the former primary negation is sometimes reappropriated for other 
pragmatic uses, such as marking of exceptive clauses in Low German (Breitbarth 2014: 165–
70) and foregrounding in Swiss French (Fonseca-Greber 2007). 
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(4)  #J’ ai   dormi  rien    du tout. Peut-être un petit peu, mais pas  beaucoup. 
   I have slept  nothing  at  all  perhaps a  little little but  NEG much 
 “I slept not at all. Maybe a little, but not much.” (Larrivée 2014: 121) 
(5) J’ ai   pas  dormi. Peut-être  un petit  peu,  mais pas  beaucoup. 
 I have NEG slept  perhaps  a  little little but  NEG much 
 “I didn’t sleep. Maybe a little, but not much.” (Larrivée 2014: 121) 
 
 A rather different understanding of ‘emphasis’ begins with Piñón (1991), who, 
building on work by Fillmore, Kay & O’Connor (1988), argues that emphatic negation in 
Hungarian serves to deny the truth of a context proposition, “a previously posed proposition 
which is part of either the spoken or unspoken, pragmatically given and shared context and a 
proposition which the speaker can either explicitly accept or reject in the course of the 
discourse” (Piñón 1991: 250). Similarly, Wallage (2017: 112–147), while retaining the term 
‘emphatic negation’, nevertheless defines it as “denial of an antecedent proposition and 
cancellation of an inference”. 
 Other linguists distinguish this or related special pragmatic functions for certain 
negators in some languages, but do not equate that function with ‘emphasis’. Espinal (1999) 
argues that, in central dialects of Catalan, bipartite negation with no…pas enriches the 
pragmatic interpretation of negation either (i) to deny a contextually available proposition or 
inference; or (ii) to confirm a negative proposition that can be contextually inferred. The 
former situation is illustrated in (6), where B denies speakers A’s assumption that A will be 
able to tell B something tomorrow. The latter is found in (7), where the inference of the first 
sentence that you have not changed is confirmed by the second. 
 
(6)  A. Demà   t’ho  diré. 
  tomorrow you-it tell.FUT.1SG 
  “I’ll tell you tomorrow.” (Espinal 1999: 354) 
 B. Oh! no  ens veurem    pas  demà. 
  oh  NEG we see.FUT.1PL PAS  tomorrow 
  “Oh! I will not see you tomorrow.” (Espinal 1999: 355) 
(7)  Al  col·legi  ja   eres     irònic i   sorneguer. Veig     que 
 in.the school  already be.IMPF.2SG ironic and  mocking  see.PRS.1SG that 
 no  has       pas  canviat. 
 NEG  have.PRS.2SG  PAS  changed 
 “At school you were already ironic and mocking. I see that you have not changed.” 
(Espinal 1999: 355) 
 
This differs from Piñón’s (1991) interpretation of the Hungarian case discussed above in 
allowing the negation to confirm an existing negative proposition, and in not using the term 
‘emphasis’ to describe what is going on. 
 Schwenter (2006) argues that Catalan, Italian and Brazilian Portuguese can offer us 
living insights into stage II of Jespersen’s cycle and proposes a more detailed analysis of the 
distribution of negative forms in those languages. Schwenter accepts Israel’s (2001) 
definition of the term ‘emphatic’ as describing “the high informativity of a proposition 
relative to a scalar norm” (Schwenter 2006: 221, cf. above). Given this definition, it is clear 
that, in all of these cases, the postverbal negative element is not in fact emphatic but is 
instead regulated by information structure (2006: 329). Using Dryer’s (1996) notion of 
‘activation’, Schwenter unites Espinal’s two contexts for the licensing of Catalan postverbal 
pas by suggesting that it is licensed by some prior element in the discourse (or physical 
context) referring to the same proposition: the proposition being negated must be discourse 
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old (and also salient), although the relationship between the prior element in the discourse 
and the proposition may be one of inference. Pas is thus sensitive to the discourse status of 
the proposition being negated and not its hearer status. An important practical distinction 
between this ‘activation hypothesis’ and the cancellation-of-presupposition hypothesis is that 
pas can be used to agree with a prior negative statement in the discourse as well as to 
disagree with a positive one (Schwenter 2006: 333–334).  
 Finally, some linguists retain the terms ‘emphasis’ and ‘emphatic negation’ but apply 
them in a different way. Some simply have a wider definition of emphasis and allow it to take 
many forms. Thus, Kiparsky & Condoravdi (2006: 179–180), discussing multiple complete 
instances of Jespersen’s cycle in Greek, write that emphatic negatives can have three 
functions: contradiction of a previous (possibly implicit) assertion; denial of an existing 
presupposition or expectation; and lifting contextual restrictions on the negative assertion, in 
particular, disambiguating telic and atelic readings of predicates by forcing a telic 
interpretation (e.g. an interpretation of I haven’t eaten the porridge as “I haven’t eaten any of 
the porridge”). Detges & Waltereit (2002) also seem to operate with a wider understanding of 
emphasis that includes both maximization of informativity and denial of presupposition 
among the possible forms that it might take. 
 In this paper, we take ‘emphasis’ and ‘activation’ to be distinct hypotheses about the 
pragmatic function of a given negator (cf. Larrivée 2016). We will limit ‘emphasis’ to refer to 
highly informative negation in the sense of Israel (2001, 2011) and Eckardt (2006, 2012), 
while we understand ‘activation’ to refer to sensitivity to information structure in the sense of 
Dryer (1996) and Schwenter (2006). 
 
5 Operationalizing activation 
Larrivée (2010: 2242) notes that it is difficult, without access to native-speaker intuitions, to 
test whether a given use of a negator is emphatic in the sense defined above. He suggests that, 
when faced with a corpus of historical data, a linguist will be better placed to test whether an 
item is sensitive to activation than whether it is emphatic. This section develops the notion of 
activation further, introducing the various categories of information status that have been 
proposed. Existing studies demonstrate that markers of negation can be sensitive to 
information structure in different ways. This suggests a historical pathway for change. We 
will apply these notions in practice to early Norwegian textual data in the second part of this 
paper. Our central hypothesis will be that the notion of activation was central in mediating 
Jespersen’s cycle in early Norwegian. 
 The concept of activation has been used to analyse the distribution of various negative 
items, and a variety of patterns has emerged. Schwenter (2006) extends the activation 
analysis to those varieties of Italian which use non…mica in a construction II negation, noting 
that it is licensed (but not obligatory) when the proposition is part of the common ground and 
discourse old (and salient) (Schwenter 2006: 334–336; see also Cinque 1976 and Zanuttini 
1997: 61, who make the same observation). 
 Brazilian Portuguese presents a somewhat more complex case, as here variation is 
found between all three stages of Jespersen’s cycle: stage I with only a preverbal negative; 
stage II with both pre- and postverbal negatives; and stage III with only a postverbal negative. 
Here Schwenter demonstrates that, just as in Catalan and Italian, construction II is licensed by 
the proposition being discourse-old and salient. The conditions for construction III are the 
same except that the proposition must be explicitly activated within the discourse, not merely 
inferred (Schwenter 2005: 1450, 2006: 336–340). In (8), speaker F denies a proposition 
(“You cook”) that has been explicitly activated by speaker E in the preceding context: 
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(8)  E. Mas você cozinha. E você deve ter algum prato que os seus fregueses gostam  
  mais. Qual é? 
  “But you cook. And you must have some dish that your clients like most. What is 
it?” 
 F. Ah, eu cozinho não, a minha tia é que cozinha! 
  “Ah, I don’t cook; my aunt is the one that cooks!” (Schwenter 2005: 1450) 
 
 In the historical domain, Hansen (2009) and Hansen & Visconti (2009) investigate the 
transition from stage I to stage II of Jespersen’s cycle in Old French, aiming to determine 
whether the variation found there was conditioned by the same information-structure factors 
as in the modern Romance languages. They find similar, but not identical conditioning 
factors, and propose a more detailed typology of information statuses on the basis of Birner 
(2006) to account for these. Specifically, they distinguish two types of inference: forward or 
elaborating inference, where a proposition can be immediately inferred by the hearer from a 
trigger, and backward or bridging inference, where a proposition can only be inferred from or 
linked to an earlier trigger in retrospect. 
These types are exemplified by (9) and (10). In (9), the existence of the wedding can 
be forward-inferred from the statement “she got married”: it is immediately possible for the 
hearer to make this inference and so the existence of the wedding is both discourse-old and 
hearer-old when it is mentioned in the next clause (the fact that it is discourse-old is 
confirmed by the word order as only discourse-old constituents can be preposed; Birner 2006: 
16). In (10), a classic example of a bridging inference reproduced in several publications, the 
existence of the beer cannot be automatically inferred from the mention of the picnic as not 
all picnics involve beer; however, the inferential relationship between the two is clear once 
the beer is mentioned explicitly. Accordingly, at this point the existence of the beer can be 
considered discourse-old but hearer-new. 
 
(9) She got married recently, and at the wedding was the mother, the step-mother and 
Debbie. (Birner 2006: 22) 
(10) We checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm. (Haviland & Clark 1974: 515) 
 
 Whereas construction II in Catalan and Italian is licensed only when the proposition 
has been explicitly stated, is part of the perceptual context, or can be forward inferred from 
earlier discourse, in Old French construction II was also licensed when it was backward-
inferable from earlier discourse. Furthermore, in Old French construction II was sensitive not 
only to the discourse status of the negated proposition, but also the hearer status: it was also 
licensed in contexts where the proposition was discourse new but hearer old, such as where 
the proposition represented part of general common knowledge or where it was pragmatically 
presupposed by an element in earlier interaction (Hansen 2009: 235–236). 
 In addition, Hansen noted that where construction I in Old French was used to negate 
a proposition which was discourse and/or hearer old, there tended to be certain ‘special 
semantic features’ which downplayed the discourse salience of that information status: it 
tended to occur in irrealis and non-referential contexts such as the antecedent or consequent 
of conditionals, in maxim-like statements, with modal verbs and in non-declarative clauses 
(Hansen 2009: 244–245). This further strengthens the case for a relationship between the 
choice between construction I and construction II in Old French and information structure. 
 Table 1 summarizes the resulting typology of information structure contexts. 
Applying this typology to those cases of construction I yields the pattern in Table 2. This can 
be compared to the situation for construction II (plus construction III with Brazilian 
Portuguese não) summarized in Table 3. We immediately see that, while construction I is 
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felicitous in all information-structure contexts, construction II is restricted to a continuous 
sequence at the discourse-old end of an information-structure hierarchy. Whether this set of 
contexts truly represents an implicational scale or whether other combinations are possible 
remains to be seen. Certain other distinctions examined by Hansen (2009), such as whether 
the proposition in question has been previously asserted or denied (or whether assertion or 
denial of it can be inferred), whether the proposition is part of the perceptual common ground 
or has been explicitly stated, and whether the proposition is part of general common 
knowledge or is a pragmatic presupposition in preceding discourse, have not been found to be 
relevant to the distribution of any of the negatives so far examined. 
 
Table 1. Typology of information structure contexts. 
 discourse-old (explicit) 
discourse-old 
(inferred) discourse-new 
hearer-old explicitly 
mentioned 
forward-inferable common 
knowledge/pragmatically 
presupposed 
hearer-new — backward-inferable completely new 
 
 
Table 2. Typology of construction I negatives. 
form explicitly mentioned 
forward-
inferable 
backward-
inferable 
common 
knowledge 
completely 
new 
Old French ne … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Catalan no … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Italian non … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Braz. Port. não … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
 
 
Table 3. Typology of constructions II and III. 
form explicitly mentioned 
forward-
inferable 
backward-
inferable 
common 
knowledge 
completely 
new 
Old French ne … pas/mie felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous infelicitous 
Catalan no … pas felicitous felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
Italian non … mica felicitous felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
Braz. Port. não … não felicitous felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
Braz. Port. Ø … não felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
 
 
 One further case study of variation during Jespersen’s cycle has been undertaken 
which has not been discussed thus far: that of construction I/II/III variation in Middle 
English. Wallage (2013: 10–15, 2017: 118–34) finds that none of the forms of negation are 
categorically restricted according to the information status of the negated proposition across 
the entire Middle English period, but that, during the period 1150–1250, construction I (ne 
…) is statistically specialized for discourse new propositions and construction II (ne … not) is 
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statistically specialized for discourse-old propositions (while the occurrence of construction 
III, … not, appears to be unrelated to information structure). However, Wallage explicitly 
opts not to take into account text-external factors that might have some bearing on the 
discourse and hearer status of the negated proposition: “As texts cannot be read in the social 
and cultural contexts in which they were written, the socio-cultural common ground between 
writer and reader that informs interpretation of the discourse is missing. Therefore we can 
only examine the relationships between propositions within the texts themselves.” (Wallage 
2013: 10; cf. also Wallage 2017: 119). Furthermore, he does not make the distinction 
between forward and backward inference. Thus it is difficult to fit Middle English neatly into 
the typology drawn above. From the evidence, it is hard to determine whether Middle English 
construction II was preferred or dispreferred in discourse-old but hearer-new contexts 
(backward-inferable) and in discourse-new but hearer-old contexts (common knowledge, 
pragmatic presupposition). Given this information it might conceivably emerge that Middle 
English construction II represented an exact parallel case to Old French construction II 
(felicitous for all propositions except those which were both hearer-new and discourse-new) 
or that it was parallel to the Old French construction II or modern Romance construction II 
cases but subject to a statistical as opposed to categorical restriction. 
  
6 Negation in North Germanic 
A number of changes in the expression of negation have taken place in the history of North 
Germanic. The inherited preverbal negative adverb ne (cognate with Old High German ni, 
Old English ne, Gothic ni) was replaced by the suffixed negative -a(t) (apparently from the 
numeral *aint “one (neuter)”, Magnússon 1989: 29) via Jespersen’s cycle. Example (11) 
illustrates the use of the preverbal ne negative, while (12) provides two instances of the -a(t) 
negative that replaced it. 
 
(11) stjǫrn-ur    þat     né  viss-i       hvar  þær    stað-i  
 star.PL-NOM.PL NT.ACC.SG NEG KNOW.PRET-3PL where F.NOM.PL  PLACE-ACC.PL 
 átt-o.       mán -i      þat     né  viss-i, 
 possess.PRET-3PL moon-NOM.SG  NT.ACC.SG NEG know.PRET-3SG 
 hva-t       hann    megin-s    átt-i, 
 what-NT.ACC.SG M.NOM.SG power-GEN.SG  possess.PRET-3SG 
 “The the stars did not know where they had their places, the moon did not know what 
power he possessed.” (Vǫluspá 5) 
 
(12) Fann-k-a      ek  mild-an        mann,     eða  svá  
 find.PRET-1SG -NEG 1SG  generous-M.ACC.SG  man.ACC.SG  or   so  
 mat-ar     góð-an,     at   væri-t   þiggj-a  
 food-GEN.SG good-M.ACC.SG  COMP  be-NEG   accept-INF  
 þeg-it,         eða  sín-s       fé-ar      svá-gi 
 accept-PPT.NT.ACC.SG  or   REFL-GEN.SG  money-GEN.SG so-NEG 
 [glǫggv -an],   at   leið         sé      laun, 
 stingy-M.ACC.SG COMP hateful.NT.NOM.PL be.SUBJ.3SG reward.NOM.PL 
 ef  þæg-i.  
 if  get.SUBJ-3SG. 
 “There is no person so munificent or generous not to accept a gift, or so unmiserly 
with their money that a reward would be hateful, if they might get one.” (Hávamál 39) 
 
Enclitic -(a)t was subsequently replaced by other adverbs, primarily eigi (< ei “ever” + 
indefinite particle -gi) and later its contracted form ei. Example (13) shows an instance of the 
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new negative eigi. 
 
(13) fund-um  ver    rænt-ur   ok  prouenð-or    hennar  miock sma-r 
 find.PRET-1PL NOM.1PL rent-ACC.PL and prebend-ACC.PL F.GEN.SG very       small-PL 
 ver-a  sua at þær    nœgi-a-zt          æigi viðrkœmilæga 
 BE-INF so that F.NOM.PL suffice.PRES-3PL-MIDDLE  NEG becomingly 
 “we found her rents and prebends to be so small that they do not suffice becomingly” 
(DN III.10, 1267) 
 
These changes, which are already well advanced in the earliest extant alphabetic Old Norse 
texts, are relatively well understood (Eythórsson 2002). However, ei(gi) was then replaced by 
a new adverb, ekki, originally the neuter nominative/accusative singular of the negative 
adjective/pronoun engi “no, none, no one, nothing” (ekki < *eitt-ki < *eitt-gi, Magnússon 
1989: 149), in all of the North Germanic languages. This results in the modern forms 
Norwegian Bokmål/Danish ikke, Nynorsk ikkje (and dialectal Norwegian isje, itte), Faroese 
ikki and Icelandic ekki. In the history of Swedish, the cycle repeated once more and ekki was 
replaced by enkti, the regularized neuter nominative/accusative singular of the negative 
pronoun/adjective (Hellquist 1922: 275); this results in Modern Swedish inte. This further 
development also took place in south-eastern Norwegian dialects, giving forms like inte 
(Østfold) and itte (Indre Austlandet) (Johannessen et al. 2009; Mæhlum & Røyneland 2012: 
52–3). While the status of ikke in the modern languages has received some attention (e.g. K. 
K. Christensen’s 1985 treatment of ikke as a clitic; see also K. R. Christensen 2005 and 
Munch 2013), the change from ei(gi) to ekki in the medieval period has gone largely 
unstudied. Blaxter (2015) deals with the change in Old Icelandic, but from a purely 
sociolinguistic perspective. Standard histories of the language mention it only in passing, if at 
all (e.g. Indrebø 1951: 245). Existing analyses of the development of negation in Old and 
Middle Norwegian, such as K. R. Christensen (2003) and van Gelderen (2008: 205–211), 
treat the shift from ne or -a(t) to modern ikke as a direct one. They thus assume ikke to be a 
phonological variant of eigi, overlooking an additional cycle of change. 
 Unlike a number of construction II negatives mentioned above, ekki does not have its 
etymology in a noun for a small object functioning as a minimizer in negative clauses, but in 
an adjective/pronoun meaning “no(thing)”. This, in connection with the observation 
mentioned above that it also occurs frequently as a negative adverb with comparative 
adjectives, offers a clue to its pathway to become a clausal negative and the reason that this 
particular instantiation of Jespersen’s cycle advanced directly from stage I to stage III. 
 Breitbarth, Lucas & Willis (2013) suggest that there is a fairly small set of possible 
bridging contexts for the emergence of incipient Jespersen’s cycle where a direct object can 
be reanalysed as a negative adverb. They divide them broadly into two types: (i) optionally 
transitive verbs such as eat, drink, read, write; and (ii) predicates taking an optional degree 
argument. Willis (2016) applies this to the incipient uses of Old English nāwiht “nothing”. He 
shows, on the one hand, that nāwiht occurs commonly as the degree argument of verbs of 
succeeding, harming and caring. However, even more common are cases where it is used as a 
degree modifier of an adjective or adverb, either with narrow focus on the adverb under 
sentential negation, or else with constituent negation. 
 Old Norwegian offers parallel opportunities. In (14), ekki can be found negating the 
comparative adjective meira. 
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(14) kom  ekki  meira þa  fram   firir  oss    at þui        sinn-i. 
 came EKKI  more  then forward before us.DAT at  that.M.DAT.SG time-DAT.SG 
 “No more [evidence] then came before us at that time.” (DN II.146, 1322) 
 
Examples such as this could have been acquisitionally ambiguous between an analysis in 
which ekki forms a noun-phrase constituent with meira (“no more [evidence] came before 
us”) and one in which it is taken as a negative adverb (“more [evidence] did not come before 
us”). Thus they provide a possible bridging context for the reanalysis that first enabled ekki to 
function as a negative adverb. Furthermore, the older sentential negator, ei(gi), could also 
occur in these constructions, offering an analogical parallel for the reanalysis of ekki and a 
model for extension from this to contexts without the presence of a comparative adjective. 
 In (15), where the object of the verb is a neuter noun in the accusative singular, the 
function of ekki is ambiguous between a negative adverb (“Arnfinnr and Sigurðr did not have 
evidence thereof”) and a negative adjective (“Arnfinnr and Sigurðr had no evidence 
thereof”). Since this word order, with negative directly following the finite verb, is also 
possible with the older negative ei(gi), as seen, for instance, with vilit æigi ‘will not’ in 
example (16) (cf. also (13) above), a reanalysis of ekki as a negative adverb is entirely 
feasible. 
 
(15) þeir        Arnfinn -er      ok   Sigurd-er      optnemnd-er 
 they.M.NOM.PL Arnfinnr-NOM.SG  and  Sigurð-NOM.SG  oft-mentioned-NOM.PL 
 haf-d-u     ecki  prof     þer 
 have-PST-3PL ekki  evidence   there 
 “the oft-mentioned Arnfinnr and Sigurðr had no evidence thereof” (DN III.163, 1332) 
 
(16) sua fram-t     sem  þer  vil-it   æigi  luk-a 
 so forward-ADV  that  2PL  will-2PL EIGI   pay-INF 
 tuænn-ar      landskylld-ir 
 two.kinds-F.ACC.PL land.rent-ACC.PL 
 “to such an extent that you would not pay two kinds of land-rent” (DN I.86, 1297) 
 
 Other instances exemplify contexts in which ekki was acquisitionally ambiguous 
between a negative indefinite acting as a degree argument and a negative adverb. In (17), the 
function of ekki is ambiguous between a negative adverb (“[he] didn’t do [anything] to him”) 
and a negative pronoun object of the verb (“[he] did nothing to him”). 
 
(17) æn  Þorgæir  uar i   gong-u-nne           medr  þæim     ok  
 but  Þórgeirr  was in walk-DAT.SG-DEF.M.DAT.SG with  them.DAT.PL  and 
 vann    ækki  a honum 
 achieved  ekki  on him.DAT.SG 
 “but Þórgeirr was walking with them and didn’t harm him” (DN II.156, 1280) 
 
 These contexts where there was acquisitional ambiguity in alphabetic Old Norwegian 
between ekki as a negative adverb and ekki in one of its historically prior functions all have 
one thing in common: they contain only the new negative, not both the old and new 
negatives. There was no context containing ei(gi) ... ekki where the reanalysis could have 
taken place and thus no construction II with ei(gi) ... ekki ever arose. Furthermore, given 
certain properties of the grammar of Old Norwegian, no such context could ever have been 
available. The canonical cases of Jespersen’s cycle exemplifying stage II are either in 
languages with negative concord, where constructions with multiple negatives would be 
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possible or even required and would express only a single logical negation, and/or concern an 
innovative form based on an earlier negative polarity item. Old Norwegian did not allow 
negative concord and pronominal/adjectival ekki was not a negative polarity item but a true 
negative indefinite. Thus any construction containing both ei(gi) and ekki would have 
resulted in a double logical negation, and could not have been the basis of a new form of 
clausal negation. 
Whether or not synchronic variation between the different Jespersen’s cycle 
constructions is always conditioned by information-structure factors like those which 
structure construction I/II variation in Old French, modern Italian and Catalan and 
construction I/II/III variation in Brazilian Portuguese is a topic of ongoing investigation 
(Willis, Breitbarth & Lucas 2013: 10–11). The change from ei(gi) to ekki, with its 
progression directly from stage I to stage III, thus represents a particularly interesting test 
case for this topic. 
 The primary source of Old Norwegian and the only source of Middle Norwegian is a 
large corpus of legal letters (charters) known as the Diplomatarium Norvegicum (DN). The 
DN contains 13,939 texts in a Nordic language, comprising around 3.58 million words. There 
are certain limitations in using the DN for linguistic research: charters are highly formulaic 
and possibly high register; we do not know precisely who wrote and who dictated them, 
making attribution of particular linguistic features to particular speakers problematic. 
However, they are dated and often we have access to original documents rather than copies. 
From the latter half of the fifteenth century onwards it becomes progressively more difficult 
to distinguish between Norwegian and Danish usage in the DN, and even before this point 
East North Germanic influence affects many texts to a degree. The use of the DN in 
sociolinguistic research is discussed in more detail by Mørck (1980, 1999) and Blaxter 
(2017). It remains the best source we have for the Norwegian language in this period. In light 
of these issues, Mørck (1999) suggests selecting only a small subset charters for study: those 
which are least formulaic and show the least evidence of Danish or Swedish influence. 
However, this is impractical for less frequent phenomena such as the one under consideration 
since the resulting dataset would be too small. Furthermore, such a procedure is designed for 
research into language-external factors; given that our research questions here do not focus 
on who was involved in the change from ei(gi) to ekki but rather how this change took place, 
there is much less reason to consider some texts better evidence than others. Our approach 
here is thus to map the variation and change affecting these elements in these texts, 
acknowledging the caveat that our conclusions can refer only to the particular register, 
sociolect and dialects for which we have evidence. 
 Examples can already be found in thirteenth-century DN texts of ekki functioning as a 
negative adverb: 
 
(18) læid      saa  tim-i     oc  kom       hann    æcki 
 pass.PRET.3SG  thus hour-NOM.SG and come.PRET.3SG  M.NOM.SG EKKI 
 “an hour passed and he did not come” (DN III.30, 1291) 
 
This early period thus represents the period of variation between constructions I and III. 
Relative frequencies of the three negatives by year in the DN are shown in Figure 1 (with raw 
data in Table 4). Note that these counts cover all instances of ekki, including those where it 
appears in its historically prior adjectival/(pro)nominal function. 
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Figure 1. Relative frequencies of ei, eigi and ekki in the Diplomatarium Norvegicum by 25-
year period, 1250–1575. 
 
 
Table 4. Relative frequencies of ei, eigi and ekki in the Diplomatarium Norvegicum by 25-
year period, 1250–1575. 
 
       period ei eigi ekki   % ei % eigi % ekki 
1250 – 1275 1 2 1   25% 50% 25% 
1275 – 1300 36 54 19  33% 50% 17% 
1300 – 1325 81 244 86  20% 59% 21% 
1325 – 1350 203 214 93  40% 42% 18% 
1350 – 1375 106 74 41  48% 33% 19% 
1375 – 1400 190 49 57  64% 17% 19% 
1400 – 1425 183 27 59  68% 10% 22% 
1425 – 1450 406 14 104  77% 3% 20% 
1450 – 1475 203 3 102  66% 1% 33% 
1475 – 1500 260 6 198  56% 1% 43% 
1500 – 1525 359 1 945  28% 0% 72% 
1525 – 1550 785 2 4022  16% 0% 84% 
1550 – 1575 84 2 580   13% 0% 87% 
 
 
 Figure 1 shows clearly the replacement of the original full form eigi with the reduced 
form ei, with the crossover point reached around 1340. This pattern is consistent with our 
assumption that the change from eigi to ei was purely phonological and not an instantiation of 
Jespersen’s cycle. If so, then eigi and ei can be treated as a single variant. Collapsing these 
two categories, the relative frequencies of ei(gi) (construction I negation) and ekki 
(construction III negation) are thus as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Relative frequencies of ei(gi) and ekki in the Diplomatarium Norvegicum by 25-
year period, 1250–1575. 
 
 As can be seen from these figures, the relative frequencies of constructions I and III 
were relatively stable at 80% and 20% respectively until around 1425, at which point the 
relative frequency of ekki rose sharply. On the basis of this, we hypothesize that, in the period 
before 1425, there were restrictions on the occurrence of ekki, and that these were then lost, 
allowing it to compete directly with ei(gi). Given the broader context of research on new 
markers of negation, we hypothesize that these restrictions were initially grounded in 
information structure.  
 
7 Method 
It is this hypothesis which we now test on the basis of detailed textual examination of 
instances of negation in the charters before 1425. All instances of ekki in the Diplomatarium 
Norvegicum were identified and those occurring in the period 1250–1425 were examined in 
detail. The corpus was also searched for doublings of negatives, both including ekki and other 
negatives and negative indefinites, and none were identified. The following categories of 
document were excluded from consideration as providing unreliable evidence or as providing 
insufficient evidence for analysis in terms of information structure: 
 
(i) those known or suspected to be forgeries (64 texts); 
(ii) those known to be copies of older documents (and therefore whose date attribution is 
questionable; 2277 texts); 
(iii) those which do not take charter form (such as list-form records of goods or sales; this 
was done after tokens were identified, and in practice affected just one text). 
 
The resulting corpus, made up of true, original, Nordic-language texts dating no later than 
1425, comprised 3528 texts and approximately 723,392 words. By examining distinctive 
names and titles of first signatories, we can estimate that these texts reflect the production of 
1836 different authors. 
 The function of ekki in each case was identified and those in which it functioned (or 
could plausibly be read as functioning) as an adjective, as in (19), or a pronoun, as in (20), 
were excluded. These were 64 cases of pronominal function and 17 cases of adjectival 
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function. 
 
(19) leggi-um ver  ecki skaplag      ne   skylld-u 
 lay-1PL   we  EKKI tax.N.ACC.SG  nor   due-ACC.SG 
 a  nockor-n    lærð-an      mann 
 on  any-M.ACC.SG learned-M.ACC.SG man.ACC.SG 
 “we impose no tax nor due on any learned man” (DN I.59, 1263–1265) 
 
(20) Saker þærs at  ekke er mann-e-nom          vis-are      en  
 because     EKKI is   man-DAT.SG-DEF.M.DAT.SG  certain-COMP   than 
 dauð-inn 
 death-DEF.M.NOM.SG 
 “Because nothing is more certain to man than death” (DN I.70, 1280–1286) 
 
 The remaining 119 instances were those in which ekki had adverbial function. Among 
these, two frequent patterns emerged. Firstly, ekki was very commonly found modifying a 
comparative adjective: 
 
(21) skil-d-u     þau  ok  s[er  all-a]     þeira  lifdag -a    en 
 decide-PST-3PL they also REFL all-M.ACC.PL their  life.days-ACC.PL but  
 ecki  leng-r 
 ekki  long-COMP 
 “they also made an agreement for themselves for all the days of their lives but no 
longer...” (DN II.72, 1304) 
 
This may provide a hint at the pathway of change via which adverbial ekki was first 
innovated, as noted above. In total there were 34 examples of this type; since they do not 
represent ekki functioning as a clausal negative, they were excluded from further analysis. 
 The remaining 85 examples were those in which ekki functioned as a clausal negative. 
To give an impression of the regional spread of the data, Figure 3 presents a visualization of 
the localizations of these texts. Outside the boundaries of the map, texts were also localized 
to the Faroe Islands, Orkney and Shetland, Hålogaland and Finnmark (for further background 
on text localizations, see Blaxter 2017: 86–98). 
 Among these, a striking number (16/85) appeared specifically in the context of stating 
that individuals who had been summoned to appear in court failed to appear. A variety of 
different exact wordings were found, illustrated in (22) and (23), so these did not appear to 
represent a legal formula. Rather, this seemed to point towards exactly the hypothesis being 
tested, namely, that ekki was used here to cancel the inference from “they were summoned to 
appear” to “they appeared”. 
 
(22) En  Þolfu-ar     a  Æikin-i      kom  ækki ok  ængh-in 
 but  Þólfr-NOM.SG of Eikinn-DAT.SG came  EKKI and none-M.NOM.SG 
 hans vmbodsmað-r      j  aðrnæmfd-an        laghudagh 
 his   representative-NOM.SG in aforementioned-M.ACC.SG lawday.ACC.SG 
 “Þólfr of Eikinn did not come on the aforementioned day for legal cases, nor did any 
representative of him.” (DN I.269, 1341) 
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Figure 3. Map of text localizations. 
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(23) En  af þui at  Halzstæin     var  ækki aa stæmfn-u      fyrst-æ  
 but  because   Hallsteinn.NOM.SG was EKKI at meeting-DAT.SG first-M.ACC.PL 
 tua      dagh-a 
 two.M.ACC day-ACC.PL 
 “But because Hallsteinn was not at the meeting for the first two days...” (DN II.432, 
1374) 
 
All of these instances in which ekki functioned as a clausal negative were examined in detail. 
Any earlier statements related to the negated proposition were identified and the relationship 
between the two was categorized according to the scheme give in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Categorization scheme for Old and Middle Norwegian negatives. 
 
relation of preceding discourse to 
negated proposition 
information status 
explicit assertion of proposition explicitly mentioned 
explicit denial of proposition explicitly mentioned 
explicit mention of proposition without 
assertion or denial 
explicitly mentioned 
forward-inferable assertion of proposition forward-inferred 
forward-inferable denial of proposition forward-inferred 
forward-inferable activation of proposition 
without assertion or denial 
forward-inferred 
backward-inferable assertion of proposition backward-inferred 
backward-inferable denial of proposition backward-inferred 
backward-inferable activation of 
proposition without assertion or denial 
backward-inferred 
 
 
The proposition was then categorized for other factors which could affect its information 
status, as listed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Other information-structure factors considered. 
 
factor information status 
part of perceptual common ground explicitly mentioned 
part of general common knowledge common knowledge 
pragmatically presupposed by preceding 
discourse common knowledge 
 
 
 All instances of ei(gi) occurring in the same charter as an instance of ekki functioning 
as a clausal adverb were then examined; this comprised 69 tokens of ei(gi) (of which 3 were 
in the meeting formula mentioned above). This subset of the instances of ei(gi) in the period 
under consideration was chosen to ensure that all of the instances of ei(gi) examined would 
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come from texts whose grammar contained this variation between ei(gi) and ekki. Thus if 
some of the variation represented by Figures 1 and 2 reflected not contextually conditioned 
intraspeaker variation between ei(gi) and ekki but interspeaker variation in the grammaticality 
of ekki as a clausal adverb, this would not confound results of the comparison. 
 As with the instances of ekki, all these instances of ei(gi) were then categorized 
according to their relationship with any earlier statements in the discourse and for other 
factors affecting their information status. Blaxter extracted the negatives from the texts before 
both authors categorized the examples blind; that is, without reference to whether the 
negative word in a given sentence was ei(gi) or ekki. Cases of disagreement in the 
independent categorization were then discussed to produce a consensus attribution of each 
example to a single category. 
 
8 Results 
The results of these categorizations are given in Tables 7, 8 and 9. First, consider the rates at 
which the negated proposition was denied or asserted in the preceding discourse, given in 
Table 7. As can be seen, there is not a large difference in the rate at which the negated 
proposition has earlier been denied or asserted between ekki and ei(gi). The difference is not 
significant according to a χ² test (χ²=0.038, df=1, p=0.8454). This suggests that the difference 
in function of ekki and ei(gi) cannot have been that ekki was used to deny the truth of a 
previously asserted proposition. 
 
Table 7. Relationship of negated propositions to denials or assertions in the preceding 
discourse. 
 
The negated proposition has earlier 
been... all % ekki % eigi % 
denied 17 11.18% 11 13.10% 6 8.82% 
asserted 82 53.95% 51 60.71% 31 45.59% 
neither 53 34.87% 22 26.19% 31 45.59% 
 
 
 Secondly, consider the breakdown into more complex categories of the information 
status of the negated proposition, given in Table 8. No evidence can be seen here for any of 
the distinctions not found to be relevant in previous studies (such as the difference between 
explicitly mentioned and common ground, or the difference between presupposition and 
common knowledge). Thus the categories were collapsed into only those found to be relevant 
in earlier studies on variation during Jespersen’s cycle. For this simplified categorization, in 
cases where the proposition was both backward-inferable (and thus discourse old) and 
presupposed or common knowledge (and thus hearer old), it was counted in the forward-
inferable category on the basis that it was discourse old and hearer old but not explicitly 
mentioned. Example (24) demonstrates the explicitly mentioned type, (25) the forward-
inferable type, (26) the backward-inferable type, (27) the general common knowledge type 
and (28) the completely new type. The results of this classification are shown in Table 9. 
 
(24) sakar þess at herra Oghmunder var en heima ok ekki af stad faren ... medan han er 
heima ok ekki wt farenn ... 
 “because lord Oghmunder was still at home and not away travelling ... since he was at 
home and not out travelling ...” (DN II.370, 1362) 
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Table 8. Information status of the negated proposition. 
information status all % ekki % eigi % 
explicitly mentioned 36 23.68% 22 26.19% 14 20.59% 
forward-inferable, common ground 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
forward-inferable, presupposed 7 4.61% 5 5.95% 2 2.94% 
forward-inferable, common knowledge 2 1.32% 0 0.00% 2 2.94% 
forward-inferable 50 32.89% 31 36.90% 19 27.94% 
backward-inferable, common ground 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
backward-inferable, presupposed 4 2.63% 2 2.38% 2 2.94% 
backward-inferable, common knowledge 1 0.66% 1 1.19% 0 0.00% 
backward-inferable 16 10.53% 12 14.29% 4 5.88% 
common ground 3 1.97% 1 1.19% 2 2.94% 
presupposed 8 5.26% 4 4.76% 4 5.88% 
common knowledge 4 2.63% 3 3.57% 1 1.47% 
new 21 13.82% 3 3.57% 18 26.47% 
 
 
(25) þer budud korsbrœdrom eda þeirra vmbodsmanne koma til ydar a Halogoland … oc 
þyngiazt miok ef þeir fœre mote vanda oc þo ei vist huar þeir fyndi ydr þar… 
 “you ordered [the] choristers or their legal representative to come to you in 
Halogoland … and [it] would inconvenience [them] greatly if they travelled obliged 
to [a] meeting and nevertheless not know where they might find you there…” (DN 
III.36, 1295) 
 
(26) varr þatt sua mikitt, þreatighi manaða mata bol j iardum, er gallt fiurtanntighi marka 
ok halfa setto mark. jtem sægstantighi marka ok halfa attando mark j klæðom. gulli ok 
brendu syllfri. með beckiar gioff … vttan þenn gullrinngr kœmr her ecki við er 
Annfinnr gaf Milldridi j beckiar giof 
 “that was this much: thirty months’ food’s worth of land, [for] which 146½ marks 
[were] paid, and 167½ marks in cloth, gold and refined silver, with wedding presents 
… but the gold ring which Arnfinnr gave to Mildriðr as a wedding present is not 
included here…” (DN III.141, 1325) 
 
(27) ok allt þat gott er þeir þar j gera helpr þeim ekke til eyvirduligt lif sem eingin kemr 
ender vppa… 
 “and all the good which they do there does not help them to eternal life which comes 
to no end…” (DN III.487, 1390) 
 
(28) Profasten at Mari kirkiu j Oslo … hafua kæært firir os ok raadhæ varo at þeer vilir æi 
wtgeræ viisøyran nu. swa fullalighæ sæm þeer han her till hafuir wtgiort… 
 “The provost at Mariakirkja in Oslo … has complained before us and our council that 
you will not fulfil the royal duty now as fully as you have done before…” (DN II.539, 
1394) 
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Table 9. Simplified categorization for discourse status of the negated proposition. 
 
information status all % ekki % eigi % 
explicitly mentioned 39 25.66% 23 27.38% 16 23.53% 
forward-inferable 64 42.11% 39 46.43% 25 36.76% 
backward-inferable 16 10.53% 12 14.29% 4 5.88% 
common knowledge 12 7.89% 7 8.33% 5 7.35% 
completely new 21 13.82% 3 3.57% 18 26.47% 
 
 
 As can be seen, a large discrepancy is seen in the distribution of ei(gi) and ekki for 
two categories: forward-inferable and completely new. The difference in distribution into the 
different information-status categories for ekki and ei(gi) is significant according to a χ² test 
(χ²=17.88, df=4, p=0.0013). If the distinctions are collapsed into just completely new vs. 
discourse- and/or hearer-old, the distribution is still significant (χ²=16.891, df=1, p<0.0001). 
This is in line with the broad hypothesis that during the period of variation, constructions I 
and III would be pragmatically differentiated, just as has been found for construction I/II and 
construction I/II/III variation for other languages. Specifically, this seems most in line with 
the conclusion that ekki in early Norwegian was subject to the same restriction as that on the 
construction II negatives in Old French: it could not occur where the negated proposition was 
both discourse and hearer new. 
 The three instances where ekki was found negating a completely new proposition are 
worthy of more detailed examination, both because they represent the small subset of the data 
which was not in line with the hypothesis and because they exemplify certain issues that 
arose in the tagging of the data. 
 First, consider the following example: 
 
(29) fyrnæmdær Þorkiæl skal liokæ siræ Lodenæ þretighi mærkær peningæ firi þæt at han 
giorde ekki þæn auærkkæ vppa hans jord swm Vallær hæitir æftir þui swm þettæ bref 
sæghir swm þettæ er vidærfæst 
 “The aforementioned Þórkell shall pay Revd Loðinn thirty marks of money because 
he didn’t do the tenancy work on his land which is called Vallir in accordance with 
what this charter to which this is attached says.” (DN III.502, 1392) 
 
This clearly raises the issue of exactly what should be considered part of the prior discourse. 
There is no earlier mention of the tenancy work or the thirty-mark fine in the preceding text 
(as indeed this example occurs very near the beginning of the text), so there is nothing in the 
text itself from which it can be inferred that Þórkell undertook the work or did not undertake 
the work. However, in the attached document (which was evidently DN IV.559, dated three 
years earlier and concerning the same individuals), the work is enumerated and assigned to 
Þórkell: 
 
(30) Þorkiæl  skwldi  gera   allæn      þæn awærk  iord  siræ   Lodens swm  
 Þórkell  should do.INF all.M.ACC.SG  the  work  land Revd  Loðinn REL  
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 Wallær  heitir 
 Vallir  be.called.PRS.3SG 
 “Þórkell should do all the tenancy work in Revd Loðinn’s land which is called Vallir” 
(DN IV.559, 1389) 
 
 Charters were often read out (sýnda “exhibited”) at legal meetings. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the earlier charter, verifying that the work had been assigned and 
what it entailed, would have been read at the meeting before the fine was determined and the 
new charter made to record it. Thus it seems reasonable to take the earlier charter as part of 
the preceding discourse for the later one, making the information status of the proposition 
“Þórkell undertook the tenancy work on Revd Loðinn’s land” forward-inferable rather than 
completely new. Nevertheless, this highlights the problem that the exact constitution of the 
preceding discourse in such texts is often unclear. In many instances it might not be as 
obviously signposted as in this one that a given text follows on from some other text (or 
indeed some unrecorded spoken discourse). 
 Secondly, consider the following example: 
 
(31) fyrsagd hustrw Marghreta j Brandzgarde sagde swa firi honom fiorom aarom fyr en 
hon dødhe. firi gudz skuld dæil ekki vm Brandzgard æftir mina liifdagha firi þy at 
Mari kirkia j Oslo aa han æftir mina dagha. 
 “The aforementioned Mrs. Margreta of Brandsgarðr said thus before him four years 
before she died: ‘For god’s sake, do not divide up Brandsgarðr after the days of my 
life because Mariakirkja in Oslo should [possess] it after my days.’” (DN IV.583, 
1390) 
 
Again, the notion of dividing up Mrs. Margreta Brynjulfsdóttir’s land is neither raised in the 
preceding charter text nor can it be inferred from it. Here, however, two issues are raised. The 
first is an instance of the problem discussed above: the content of the preceding discourse is 
unknown. In this example, the negative occurs in reported speech; no other speech in the 
conversation is reported and the context of the conversation is not given in any detail. This 
statement might, for all we can tell, be the final word in a long conversation between Mrs. 
Margreta Brynjulfsdóttir and the other interlocutor (Barðr Gunnarssonr) about what to do 
with the land, but could equally be a statement made out of the blue about a topic they had 
never previously discussed. With so little information, it is hard to have much confidence in 
the judgment of information status. 
 The second issue is that of common knowledge. The charter states that Barðr 
Gunnarssonr is the son of Margreta Brynjulfsdóttir’s heir and it is clear from her name (in full 
hustru Marghreto Bryniulfs dottor j Brandzgarde “Mrs. Margreta Brynjulfsdóttir of 
Brandsgarðr”) that she was the owner of the land. Would it have been common knowledge, 
and thus assumed as hearer old, that her heir(s) would have divided up the land after her 
death? 
 Finally, consider the following example: 
 
(32) þat er bod vart oc sanner vili at þit taker ekki læiðangren a Varnnu þui at ver vilium 
at Mariekirkia capella vor j Oslo oc hennar korsbrøðr oc prester hafue frealslega 
þæn sama læiðanger eftir þui sæm hon oc þeir hafua fyr haft han. 
 “It is our order and true will that you do not take the levy at Varna because we wish 
Mariakirkja, our chapel in Oslo, and her choristers and priests to freely have that same 
levy as she and they have had it before.” (DN I.173, 1323) 
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As before, there is no preceding statement in the charter which explicitly mentions that the 
addressees (Hákon of Hvalr and Þróndr Krakasonr) might take the levy nor from which such 
a proposition could be inferred. Indeed, with the exception of the opening and closing 
formulae, the extract above constitutes the entire text of this exceptionally short charter. No 
other charter survives dated earlier than 1323 which mentions the levy at Varna. Thus on the 
basis of the textual evidence alone, the proposition must be judged as completely new. 
 It is very tempting with this example to argue that the sender (King Magnús VII 
Eiríkssonr) would not have sent this instruction were there not some reason to believe that 
Hákon of Hvalr and Þróndr Krakasonr would otherwise have taken the levy: either an earlier 
contrary instruction that was to be rescinded, an earlier piece of interaction creating a 
pragmatic presupposition, or general common knowledge. However, the danger of this line of 
argument is that it seems to be an instantiation of the more sweeping argument “why would a 
speaker deny a proposition unless there was some reason to consider it asserted otherwise?” 
(cf. Dahl’s 1979: 80 observation that negated sentences are often used to deny a previous 
assertion). This line of argument would seem to apply equally to any negative statement the 
full context for which is not known (inevitably true of almost any example in a historical 
text). Furthermore, although it might seem commonsensical that denying previous assertions 
is the canonical and primary function of negation, examination of the use of negation in real 
usage suggests that this is not the case (Schwenter 2006: 341–342). Thus, on the basis of the 
available evidence, our best judgment for this example can only be that the proposition is 
completely new and thus that the example represents an exception to the distributional pattern 
of ekki. 
 
Table 10. Final typology of construction II and III negatives. 
 
form explicitly mentioned 
forward-
inferable 
backward-
inferable 
common 
knowledge 
completely 
new 
Early Norwegian ekki felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous infelicitous 
Old Fr. ne … pas/mie felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous infelicitous 
Catalan no … pas felicitous felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
Italian non … mica felicitous felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
Braz. Port. não … não felicitous felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
Braz. Port. Ø … não felicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous infelicitous 
 
 
 Nevertheless, this leaves only one or two instances of ekki functioning as a clausal 
negative for completely new propositions (i.e. examples (31) and (32)), compared to 16 for 
ei(gi), a significantly greater proportion. Thus we can conclude that, as with other new 
negators, ekki initially negates discourse-old propositions (of any kind) and is strongly 
disfavoured for negation of completely new propositions. This is consistent with our initial 
hypothesis that ekki was subject to some kind of constraint which limited its frequency up to 
1425, and that it was the relaxing of this constraint in the period after 1425 that led to a rapid 
increase in its freqnuency and its ultimate adoption as the sole marker of sentential negation 
in Norwegian. 
 We thus place ekki and ei(gi) in the typology of Jespersen’s cycle variants as a 
parallel to the construction I/II variation found in Old French, expanding our earlier typology 
of construction II/III markers to include ekki in Table 10, and our earlier typology of 
 24 
construction I markers to include ei(gi) in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Final typology of construction I negatives. 
 
form explicitly mentioned 
forward-
inferable 
backward-
inferable 
common 
knowledge 
completely 
new 
Early Norwegian ei(gi) felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Old French ne … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Catalan no … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Italian non … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
Braz. Port. não … Ø felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous felicitous 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
Our examination of the distribution of Old and Middle Norwegian ekki has led us to conclude 
that this item was probably restricted to negating discourse-old propositions, including 
propositions that were contextually inferable or common knowledge. We have argued that it 
was this distinction that allowed two sentential negators, ei(gi) and ekki, to co-exist in the 
language up to around 1425, after which time they competed directly with one another. We 
have briefly considered the reasons for the reanalysis of ekki from a negative indefinite to a 
negative adverb, suggesting possible bridging contexts. 
The ultimate shift of ekki to become the unmarked negator seems to be mainly an 
inflationary bleaching process (a push chain, cf. examples (1)–(2) above): the loss of a 
specialized function for ekki, allowing it to appear in all contexts, was the main trigger for 
change. It should be noted, however, that two factors speak instead in favour of an 
explanation of it as a pull chain triggered by weakening of the older negator ei(gi). First, the 
rise in the frequency of ekki coincides exactly with the final disappearance of the full form 
eigi. Secondly, the syncopated form ei was a homophone for ei “yet, still; always” and in 
many contexts the two must have been ambiguous; cf. (33) for a clear example of such 
ambiguity. Positive ei does not survive into Modern Norwegian, suggesting that it was this 
meaning that was pushed out rather than the negative. Nevertheless, this singularly awkward 
ambiguity may have played a role in the dwindling use of negative ei, resulting in a hybrid 
push/pull chain as argued for in other cases by Breitbarth (2009) and Willis (2010). 
 
(33) oc af þui at æk    sa      æi ann-at          sann-ar-e 
 and because 1SG.NOM see.PRET.1SG EI anything-NT.NOM/ACC.SG true-COMP-NT.SG 
 oc æi prof-að-ezt          firir  mer 
 and EI  demonstrate-PRET-REF.3.SG  before 1SG.DAT 
 “and because I didn’t see anything truer and [it] was still/not proven before me” (DN 
II.32, 1293) 
 
Finally, we have noted that Norwegian provides an example of a crosslinguistically 
surprising direct shift from stage I to stage III negator without an intervening doubling stage. 
We have attributed this to the fact that the new negator ekki derives from an indefinite rather 
than a negative polarity item minimizer and to the absence of negative concord in Old 
Norwegian.  
 In crosslinguistic perspective, the development of ekki is well-explained by the 
hierarchy of discourse contexts identified in previous research, with new negators typically 
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spreading from discourse-old to discourse-new contexts. Our finding in a non-canonical case 
of Jespersen’s cycle strengthens the suggestion that such pragmatic differentiation of 
negatives is a universal feature of the development of negative markers, not one dependent on 
the distinctive form associated with stage II of the cycle. A plausible pathway behind this 
common finding is as follows. A minimizer functions by explicitly stating that a proposition 
applies at the most surprising point on a conceptual scale and so by implication must also 
apply at all other points (Eckardt 2006, 2012, Israel 2001, 2011), that is, it is emphatic in the 
sense adopted in section 4 above. Thus, when such a minimizer develops into a negative, it is 
already specialized for surprising contexts. Development from such emphatic negation to 
negation specialized for negating propositions which have previously been asserted, whose 
assertion can be inferred or is generally known (cf. Wallage 2017) would represent a 
systematization of a type familiar from grammaticalization studies: such a development 
might be expected immediately or shortly after the minimizer developed into a negative 
adverb or negator. The development to a negator specialized for all discourse-old 
propositions (that is, expansion to include propositions which have previously been denied or 
whose denial can be inferred from preceding discourse) and the further development to a 
negator specialized for all hearer-old propositions (that is, expansion to include propositions 
which are known to speaker and hearer but are new to the discourse) would each represent a 
bleaching or generalization, again typical of grammaticalization. It is important to note, 
however, that although this pathway seems plausible, only the latter two stages are actually 
attested: no case of a negator specialized for surprising or emphatic contexts has been 
reported in the literature.  
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Résumé 
Cet article étudie la fonction pragmatique des nouveaux marqueurs négatifs lors du 
renouvellement naissant de la négation propositionnelle par le cycle de Jespersen. Il présente 
une typologie de ces marqueurs, suggérant un parcours dans lequel ils se spécialisent 
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initialement dans des emplois de valeur informationnelle ancienne pour plus tard s’étendre à 
des usages à valeur inférée avant de se retrouver dans des propositions à valeur 
informationnellement nouvelle. Ce cadre est appliqué à un cas négligé du cycle de Jespersen 
dans les langues germaniques du Nord: le remplacement de l’ei(gi) norvégien ancien par ekki 
(à l’origine «rien») de 1250 à 1550. Nous documentons une forte augmentation de la 
fréquence d’ekki vers 1425, suggérant que, jusque-là, ekki s’était limité à nier des 
propositions à valeur d’information ancienne. Une fois cette contrainte levée, ei(gi) et ekki 
entrent directement en compétition, ce qui a entraîné le remplacement rapide de ei(gi) par 
ekki. Ce remplacement direct typologiquement inhabituel d’un négateur sans étape de 
dédoublement intermédiaire peut être attribué à l’origine du nouveau négateur comme 
indéfini négatif et à l’absence de concordance négative au début en norvégien ancien. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert die pragmatische Funktion neu entstehender 
Negationsausdrücke in der Anfangsphase von Jespersens Zyklus. Die Typologie solcher 
Ausdrücke wird umrissen und ein Entwicklungspfad vorgeschlagen, demzufolge sie 
anfänglich für den Gebrauch mit diskurs-alten Propositionen spezifiziert sind und später auf 
inferierte Propositionen ausgedehnt werden, bevor sie letztendlich auch mit diskurs-neuen 
Propositionen kombinierbar werden. Dieser Pfad wird im Folgenden herangezogen, um einen 
oft übersehenen Fall von Jespersens Zyklus im Nordgermanischen zu erklären, die Ersetzung 
des frühnorwegischen ei(gi) “nicht” durch ekki (ursprünglich “nichts”) zwischen 1250 und 
1550. Der Artikel dokumentiert den steilen Anstieg der Frequenz von ekki um ca. 1425, 
welcher suggeriert, dass ekki bis dahin auf die Negation diskurs-alter Propositionen 
beschränkt war. Nach der Aufhebung dieser Beschränkung traten ei(gi) und ekki in direkten 
Wettbewerb miteinander, was in der schnellen Ersetzung von ei(gi) durch ekki resultierte. 
Diese typologisch unerwartete Ersetzung eines Negationsausdrucks ohne Zwischenstadium 
mit Verdopplung des Ausdrucks (wie sonst bei Jespersens Zyklus üblich) kann durch den 
Ursprung des neuen Negators als negatives Indefinitpronomen, sowie durch die Abwesenheit 
von Negationskongruenz im Frühnorwegischen erklärt werden. 
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